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Abstract 
It is often said that European Parliament elections fail as an instrument to express the will 
of the European people. However, while the elections are not contested at the European 
level and are often dominated by national issues, this does not necessarily imply that they 
fail to connect policy views of voters and representatives. We examine policy congruence 
between voters and candidates, utilizing the candidate and voter surveys of the European 
Election Study 2009. First, we demonstrate that policy preferences of candidates and 
voters are constrained by three separate policy dimensions. Second, we show that the 
quality of representation is high in terms of left/right, the main dimension of conflict in 
European politics, but lower on the cultural and European integration dimensions. 
Finally, we demonstrate that in some cases the aggregation of national parties in political 
groups in the European Parliament poses problems for effective political representation. 
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The referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 in the Netherlands and France and 
the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 in Ireland revealed a major lack of 
congruence between the policy views of the political elites and the electorate. The most 
extreme case was the Netherlands where a clear majority (62%) of the electorate voted 
‘nee’ in the referendum, against the will of the major political parties in Parliament, 
together occupying 85% of the seats. Obviously, the great majority of voters were far 
more Eurosceptic than their political leaders. A similar phenomenon is the sudden rise of 
populist parties across Western Europe. To a large extent their success is built on their 
crusade against the immigration of non-western immigrants, in particular from Muslim 
countries, and the ‘Islamization’ of Western societies. Just like the issue of 
Europeanization this development suggests a failure of the traditional mainstream parties 
to represent the policy views of the electorate. Our main contention in this paper is that 
this is due to the fact that policy positions on such issues are not constrained by the main 
dimension of contestation in European politics, the left/right dimension. 
We develop our argument as follows. In the next section we discuss the main 
conditions for an effective process of representation. One of these conditions is that both 
at the level of political parties and the electorate issue positions are constrained by the 
same ideological dimension. We argue that in the European context this can only be the 
left/right dimension. The section that follows describes the policy dimensions that form 
the basis for electoral competition in European Parliament elections. We argue that policy 
preferences at the level of candidates as well as voters are structured in terms of three 
distinct dimensions: the left/right dimension, a cultural dimension, and a European 
integration dimension. We hypothesize that political representation in the European 
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Parliament will only be effective on issues constrained by the main dimension of political 
contestation in European politics, that is, the left/right dimension.  
We test this hypothesis on the basis of data on the 2009 European Parliament 
elections. We first examine the dimensionality of the issue space in each country using 
confirmatory factor analysis. The goal is to identify whether policy issues are constrained 
by the left/right dimension or form several separate policy dimensions. Our second 
research goal is to examine the level of congruence between voters and candidates across 
different policy dimensions at the national level. As the left/right dimension is the 
primary dimension of contestation in domestic European politics, we expect that there 
will be a relatively high level of congruence between voters and representatives on this 
dimension. To the extent that issues are not related to this left/right dimension, we expect 
that the level of congruence will be lower. In the last part of the analysis we examine to 
what extent the national parties are compatible policy-wise and hence whether the 
process of political representation is still effective when we aggregate it to the level of the 
political groups in the European Parliament. Finally, we reflect on the implications of our 
findings for the quality of representation in the European Union and its member states. 
 
The requirements for effective political representation 
 
What constitutes an effective process of political representation depends on one’s view 
on the function of this process. In modern (theories of) representative democracy there is 
hardly any dispute about the main function of this process: it should connect, either 
directly or indirectly, the policy preferences of the citizenry to public policy. The key 
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actors in this process, in addition to the voters, are political parties. They directly or 
indirectly translate their electoral mandate into public policy. Directly in majoritarian 
democracies where a single party gets an electoral mandate to implement its policy 
programme, indirectly in consensus democracies where after the elections parties in 
parliament have to form a coalition government based on a compromise between their 
policy programs (Powell 2000). In both systems the first important step in connecting the 
policy preferences of the voters to public policy is that elections connect these 
preferences to the policy views of political parties and their representatives in parliament. 
In this paper we focus on this first step by examining to what degree the policy views of 
political representatives match with the views of the citizens in the context of the 
European Parliament and hence how well the system of political representation works on 
the European level. 
For elections to function as instruments to link citizens’ policy preferences with 
the policy positions of representatives, two main requirements must be met. First, the 
parties must offer a choice to the electorate in terms of their policy proposals. Second, 
voters must vote according to their policy preferences. These conditions are familiar 
elements of the Responsible Party Model of representation (see e.g. American Political 
Science Association 1950; Thomassen 1994; Katz 1997). The common assumption is that 
if both conditions are met, the electoral process will lead to policy congruence between a 
particular parliamentary party and the voters who voted for them. 
However, as argued elsewhere (Thomassen 1994, 1999), these two requirements 
do not guarantee policy congruence between voters and representatives. Even when 
parties offer distinct policy programmes and all voters vote according to their issue 
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positions, the election outcome does not necessarily convey an unequivocal electoral 
mandate to political parties on any given policy issue. Political parties offer a package 
deal to the voter. By voting for a particular party, voters are forced to vote for the whole 
package, even though they might favour another party on some issues. Consequently, it is 
possible that a party represents the view of a minority of its voters on individual issues.
 The problem is only avoided when the voters voting for a particular party because 
of their position on a particular issue(-dimension) agree with the other policy positions of 
that party as well. Logically, this will only occur when these issue positions, both at the 
level of political parties and at the level of the electorate, are highly correlated; i.e. when 
both political parties, in the composition of their programmes, their representatives in 
parliament, in their legislative behaviour, and voters, when they decide which party they 
will vote for, are constrained by the same ideology. If that is the case voters by using this 
ideology or belief system as a shortcut can vote for the party that represents their policy 
preferences best without even knowing the position of political parties on each and every 
issue (Downs 1957). Only when this condition is met will elections connect the policy 
preferences of the voters for a particular party across a range of issues to the policy 
position of the party of their choice. 
Examining the effectiveness of political representation at the level of the 
European Parliament is even more complicated than at the national level. A familiar 
criticism of the system of political representation at the European level is that there is no 
such system. European political parties as such do not compete for the votes of a 
European electorate. European elections are fought by national political parties and 
mainly on national issues, voters make their choice on the basis of their opinions on 
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national issues and their perception of national political parties on these issues, and as a 
consequence, European elections fail as an instrument of democracy at the European 
level, that is, they fail to link the policy preferences of the European people to the 
decision making process in the European Parliament. 
However, even though it is true that there is no European system of political 
representation as such, this does not necessarily mean European elections fail as an 
instrument of linkage. If the requirements spelled out above are met within each member 
state this will lead to policy congruence between voters and their national MEPs. 
Furthermore, if the various national systems are compatible – in terms of having similar 
sets of parties putting forward similar policy programmes, based on the same ideological 
dimension – then they can be successfully aggregated at the European level if like-
minded national political parties jointly form political groups in the European Parliament. 
This in turn would lead to congruence between the policy positions of these transnational 
political groups and the people who (indirectly) voted for them. Taking this into account 
is relevant, because the general pattern is that MEPs vote in accordance with the majority 
of their political group in the European Parliament (Hix et al. 2007: 137). Therefore, the 
compatibility of the national political parties jointly forming political groups in the 
European parliament is an additional requirement to be met for an effective process of 
political representation at the European level. 
 
Policy dimensions in European Parliament elections 
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It has often been argued that party competition in European democracies can be largely 
reduced to a single dimension of left/right (e.g. Sani and Sartori 1983). Empirical 
research seems to confirm that left/right is the main dimension of contestation. Voters in 
general have no problem locating themselves on the left/right dimension; they have a 
clear perception of where the main political parties stand; and they vote in large numbers 
for parties near their own position on this dimension (Van der Brug and Van der Eijk 
1999; Van der Eijk et al. 2005; Van der Brug et al. 2009). Therefore, the language of 
‘left’ and ‘right’ seems to create a unidimensional discourse providing the common 
yardstick for masses and elites that is required in a model of political representation 
(Huber and Powell 1994). Research also shows that vote choice in European elections is 
strongly related to left/right positions (Van der Eijk et al. 1996: 359). 
In terms of content, the left/right dimension is most closely associated with 
economic questions, such as the redistribution of wealth and the role of the state in the 
economy. As Hooghe et al. (2004: 164) put it, the left/right dimension ‘constrains the 
positions that parties take on competing versions of capitalism in Europe’. Support for the 
economic interpretation of the left/right dimension is also provided by the cross-national 
study of Benoit and Laver (2006). They find that in all EU countries, except for Malta 
and Austria, party positions on the issue of ‘taxes and spending’ were significantly 
correlated with positions on the general left/right dimension. Due to the dominance of the 
left/right dimension in shaping party competition across countries, the national systems of 
political representation in EU member states are largely compatible. This is the case even 
after the 2004 enlargement of the European Union with ten new member states, mainly 
from Central and Eastern Europe. As a consequence these national systems of political 
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representation can be aggregated to the European level without losing much of their 
effectiveness. Even though there is not much of a truly European system of political 
representation, European party groups are remarkably distinct (competitive) and 
internally cohesive with regard to the left/right dimension, while voters across member 
states mainly vote according to their position on the left/right dimension (Schmitt and 
Thomassen 2009; Van der Brug et al. 2009; Rosema and De Vries 2011). 
All these studies suggest that the process of political representation is likely to be 
effective on the left/right dimension and therefore on issues constrained by this 
dimension. However, they do not really prove that this process is effective on each and 
every issue. This will only be the case when all policy issues are encompassed or 
constrained by this single dimension. This requirement is unlikely to be met. On the 
contrary, a growing body of research suggests that attitudes and policy positions on issues 
like law and order, European Unification, immigration and the place of ethnic minorities 
in society are not constrained by the left/right dimension (Hooghe et al. 2004; Kriesi et al. 
2006). If this is the case, whereas at the same time the behaviour of both political parties 
and voters at election time is still dominated by the left/right dimension, elections are 
doomed to fail as an instrument of linkage with regard to such issues. 
The idea that the space of political conflict in most modern Western societies can 
be reduced to a single ideological dimension was never undisputed. In Western Europe 
the religious cleavage used to be a second dimension of conflict in addition to the 
left/right dimension, basically understood as a class cleavage. Although it might be true 
that this dimension is no longer a dimension of conflict but ‘only’ a dimension of 
identification (Sani and Sartori 1983), people might still use it as a compass guiding them 
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on moral issues. A second more or less classic dimension is the libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension (Lipset 1966; Kitschelt 1994). Lipset (1966) was the first to argue that the 
traditional parties on the left were not representative of their voters on this dimension. 
Whereas these parties tend to combine a left position on the (socio-economic) left/right 
dimension with a libertarian position, their voters, in particular as far as they are less well 
educated, tend to combine a position on the left with a traditional or authoritarian position 
on non-material issues. 
Recently this discussion has been brought back to life, mainly because of the rise 
of populist parties. It is difficult to understand their success in the simple left/right 
framework. For example, Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) argue that the antagonism between 
winners and losers of the contemporary process of globalisation leads to a conflict 
between integration and demarcation. They expect that this new conflict dimension will 
increasingly take on an ethnic or nationalist character. Also, they expect that new issues 
like European integration and immigration will be integrated into this cultural dimension. 
The cultural dimension has been gaining in importance as it has become the primary basis 
on which new parties or transformed established parties seek to mobilize their electorate 
and therefore has developed into a second dimension of conflict (Kriesi et al. 2006, 
2008). The cultural dimension is conceptually strongly related to the classic libertarian-
authoritarian dimension. The same applies to the GAL-TAN dimension 
(green/alternative/libertarian vs. traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) introduced by 
Hooghe et al. (2004). 
While the cultural dimension is distinct from the left/right dimension, most 
studies find that it is not entirely separate. In terms of the positions of European political 
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parties in Western Europe, Marks et al. (2006) find a moderately strong correlation 
between the two dimensions, with parties on the left typically associated with libertarian 
(or GAL) positions, and parties on the right associated with more authoritarian (or TAN) 
positions. In contrast, the relationship was found to be in the opposite direction for parties 
in former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe: parties on the right (with 
free market economic policies) tend to be more liberal on cultural matters and more in 
favour of European integration than parties on the left. This suggests that on this 
dimension the major political groups in the European parliament will have difficulty 
meeting the requirement of the compatibility of national party delegations (cf. Van der 
Brug et al. 2004; Voeten 2004). 
In both Kriesi’s and Hooghe’s conceptual framework the issue of European 
integration is part of the cultural or GAL-TAN dimension respectively. However, in 
analyses of the issue positions of both members of the European Parliament and members 
of the national parliaments of the member states, European integration clearly came out 
as a separate dimension, distinct from both the left/right and libertarian-authoritarian 
dimensions (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999; McElroy and Benoit 2007). European 
integration appears not completely independent from left/right, though, in particular at the 
elite level, because parties opposing European integration are typically found relatively 
close to the extremes of the left/right dimension, whereas centrist parties are characterised 
by more favourable attitudes towards European integration (Hooghe et al. 2004; Schmitt 
and Thomassen 2009; Rosema and De Vries 2011). These findings lead us to expect that 
policy preferences can be understood best in terms of three distinct, but moderately 
correlated, dimensions of political contestation: the traditional left/right dimension, which 
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is strongly associated with economic issues, a cultural dimension, which strongly 
overlaps with GAL-TAN and incorporates issues like immigration, and a dimension 
related to the issue of European integration. 
 
The dimensionality of the policy space 
 
To test our hypotheses we use data from the Candidate Study and Voter Study of the 
European Election Study 2009 (EES 2009) (Advance Release 2010; Giebler et al. 2010; 
Van Egmond et al. 2010). The Candidate Study surveyed a total of 1,576 candidates from 
all 27 member states. The sample focused on parties that received over half the national 
electoral threshold and excluded candidates very low on the party list. On average, there 
were 58 respondents per member state. However, this varied widely, from 7 respondents 
in Bulgaria to 258 respondents in the UK. The Voter Study surveyed 27,069 individuals 
from all 27 member states, with a minimum of 1,000 respondents per country. Data files 
and documentation are available from the project website: www.piredeu.eu.  
The present study employs 11 attitudinal items contained in both the candidate 
and voter surveys, listed in Table 1. These items were selected as they measure different 
aspects of the three policy dimensions discussed in the previous section, namely the 
economic left/right dimension, the cultural dimension, and the EU dimension. It was also 
important to have a balance in terms of the orientation of the items – in other words, to 
include both positively worded and negatively worded items with respect to the 
dimension being measured – in order to be able to identify an acquiescence bias in the 
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data. Ten of the selected items elicited a response to a statement on a 5-point Likert scale, 
while one item used a 4-point scale. 
 
< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
The first set of analyses examines the structure of policy views among voters and 
candidates. Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using STATA version 12.0 to 
test our expectations regarding the policy space in each country. Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) estimation was used for the analysis, with missing data handled by listwise 
deletion.
1
 The candidate data and voter data are examined together, in order to produce 
comparable estimates of their respective positions on the underlying dimensions, enabling 
us to determine the degree of policy congruence. We also looked at voters and candidates 
separately (results not presented). A comparable structure was found for both levels, the 
main differences being that for candidates, positions are more tightly constrained by the 
underlying dimensions (indicated by higher factor loadings for the candidate data than the 
voter data) and the dimensions are somewhat more strongly correlated with each other. 
The model we test is shown in Figure 1. It assumes a three-dimensional policy 
space: an economic left/right dimension, on which the three economic variables load; a 
cultural dimension, on which four items load; and an EU dimension, on which four items 
load. Correlations between these latent factors are also expected (indicated by the double-
headed arrows). 
 
<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
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In addition to the factors corresponding to the three policy dimensions a ‘response 
style’ factor is included in the model. We include this factor to address a measurement 
problem in the data. As is common in Likert items, there is evidence of acquiescence 
bias, that is, a tendency among some respondents to agree with statements regardless of 
their content (McClendon 1991). This tendency is picked up by the inclusion of the 
response style factor, which follows the recommendations of Billiet and McClendon 
(2000) and Welkenhuysen-Gybles et al. (2003). There is no reason to believe that 
different items will be affected differently by acquiescence (Welkenhuysen-Gybles et al. 
2003: 707), so the style factor is constrained to have an identical loading on all of the 
Likert items in the model (but loads freely on the non-Likert item ‘democracy’). The style 
factor is further constrained to be uncorrelated with each of the three ‘content’ factors 
(Billiet and McClendon 2000: 612).
2 
An additional test confirmed that the response style 
factor does indeed measure acquiescence.
3
 
For member states in Western Europe the standardised factor loadings are 
presented in Table 2. In each of these countries the four-factor model (three policy 
dimensions plus the response style factor) provided a good fit with the data, as discussed 
in more detail below. In general, the factor loadings (which have a possible range of -1 to 
+1) are reasonably strong and in the anticipated direction. Only the item about abortion 
has consistently low loadings, which suggests that in most countries this issue is not 
incorporated in the cultural dimension. We kept the item, though, in order to maintain a 
mix of pro-trait and contra-trait items for each dimension.  
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<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe our model was not always supported by the data, as 
shown in Table 3. In five countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia) the model that included three policy dimensions plus the response style factor 
provided a good fit with the data. In Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, however, a simpler 
model containing just two policy factors performed better than the full model: a broad 
left/right factor on which the economic and cultural items load, and a separate EU factor. 
For four countries no acceptable model was found: Greece, Malta Lithuania and Latvia.
4
 
For reasons of comparability, these four countries are not included in the below analyses 
of policy congruence between voters and parties. 
Model fit indices and the inter-factor correlations for each country are listed in 
Table 4. The adequacy of the fit is evaluated using a number of recommended statistics 
(Brown 2006: 87). The standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) measures the 
extent to which the correlations from the input matrix are adequately predicted by the 
model; good-fitting models have values below 0.08. The root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) expresses the degree of model misspecification; values below 
0.08 can indicate an acceptable model fit, while values below 0.06 indicate a good fit. 
The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) evaluates the fit of the model in comparison to a 
baseline model on a scale of 0 to 1; values above 0.90 can be taken as an acceptable fit, 
and values above 0.95 indicate a good fit (Brown 2006: 87). 
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<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
For most countries the four-factor model was superior to a model with fewer 
factors (i.e. a model without the style factor, or models with fewer policy factors). Ten 
countries score well on all three fit indices. Most of the other countries (both east and 
west) have acceptable SRMR and RMSEA scores but are below the 0.90 threshold for 
CFI. Only the Netherlands and the Czech Republic perform poorly on two of the three 
measures of model fit. Overall, taking into account the fact that any model will perform 
better in some countries than in others, the model that includes three policy dimensions 
plus a response style factor can be taken to be a reasonably good fit for the data. 
The direction and the strength of the correlations between the content factors are 
also of interest (see Table 4). The first thing to note is that the correlations are generally 
modest (there is only one instance of an inter-factor correlation above 0.80, which is 
sometimes taken as a cut-off point for discriminant validity; see Brown 2006: 32), 
supporting the conclusion that the three policy dimensions are indeed distinct. In terms of 
the direction of the relationships, there are notable differences between west and east. For 
nearly all Western European countries, there is a negative correlation between the 
left/right and culture factors. Given the way the factors are oriented, this means those on 
the left on economic issues tend to be liberal on cultural issues, as expected. In contrast, 
there is a moderately strong positive correlation between these two factors for nearly all 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In line with the findings of Marks et al. 
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(2006), this implies that economically leftist voters and candidates from CEE countries 
are culturally conservative. 
These differences between east and west are not found for the other correlations. 
For all countries, there is a negative correlation between the culture and EU factors, 
implying culturally conservative respondents tend to be more Eurosceptic. There is also a 
negative correlation between the left/right and EU factor for most countries, indicating 
that left-wing respondents tend to be more opposed to EU integration. However, this 
relationship is quite weak in several Western European countries. This does not 
necessarily mean that both factors are not related, because the analysis focuses on linear 
relationships and previous research identified a non-linear relationship (Hooghe et al. 
2004; Schmitt and Thomassen 2009). However, those findings concerned the EU as a 
whole and focused on the elite level. At the mass level and when focusing on individual 
countries, those patterns are much weaker (Rosema and De Vries 2011: 209). 
To summarise, the confirmatory factor analysis shows that the attitudes of voters 
and candidates are not constrained by a single dimension. Rather, three separate policy 
dimensions were found to best capture the observed variation: an economic left/right 
dimension, a cultural dimension and an EU dimension. In only three countries (Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania) two policy dimensions produced the best fit. Thus, the 
assumption implicit in the Responsible Party Model of representation – that the opinions 
of voters and representatives on all relevant issues are constrained by a single dimension 
– does not hold. This raises the possibility that the congruence between voters and 
representatives will be weak for certain types of issues. 
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Analysis of policy congruence between voters and representatives 
 
We have argued that the level of agreement between voters and representatives will vary 
across policy domains: issues that are related to the left/right dimension are expected to 
be associated with higher levels of congruence than issues that are independent of this 
dimension. To test these expectations, we compare the positions of voters and candidates 
from each national party on the three dimensions identified in the previous section. Factor 
scores (predicted values for each latent factor) are produced for each dimension on the 
basis of the confirmatory factor analysis reported in the previous section. The advantage 
of using factor scores instead of additive indices is that they enable us to control for 
acquiescence bias, as done in the above analysis. The factor scores are standardized 
variables with a mean of zero. 
Policy congruence is analysed by determining how close each national party is to 
its voters on each dimension.
5
 National party positions are measured as the mean position 
of their candidates. The proximity of parties to their voters is measured as the mean 
absolute difference between the position of each voter and the position of the party they 
voted for. To increase the reliability of the estimates, only parties that have at least five 
candidates and 40 voters with valid responses to all 11 items are included in the analysis. 
So in countries where the response rate of the candidate survey was low, several parties 
had to be excluded. This also applies to several small parties, which did not meet the 
criterion of the voter survey. In addition, the four countries for which an acceptable factor 
solution was not found (Greece, Malta, Lithuania and Latvia) are excluded. In total, 39 
national parties meet all selection criteria and these are now focused on. 
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The policy congruence between voters and parties are presented in Figure 2. Each 
bar represents the mean absolute difference between a national party and its voters on a 
particular dimension. The results are organised by party groups and by country. The first 
panel gives the results for 12 parties affiliated with the centre-right European People’s 
Party (EPP). The difference between parties and voters is smallest on the left/right 
dimension in nearly all countries. The only exception is Slovakia, where the party is 
closest to its voters on the culture dimension. 
 
<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
The second panel in Figure 2 shows the results for eight parties affiliated with the 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). Again, parties are found to 
match best on the left/right dimension, the only exceptions being Belgium and Germany, 
where parties are slightly closer to their voters on the culture dimension. The pattern is 
repeated for parties affiliated with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE) and the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens). In both cases, 
parties perform best on the left/right dimension in all but one of the countries analysed. 
For the smaller party groups (the European Conservatives and Reformists Group 
(ECR), the Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (EUL-
NGL), and Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD)), there are very few 
national parties that meet our selection criteria. For four out of the five national parties 
included, the parties are closer to their voters on the left/right dimension than on the other 
two dimensions. This is somewhat surprising, given the emphasis these parties typically 
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place on issues related to the other two dimensions. Because of the low number of 
national parties, however, we cannot reach strong conclusions about these party groups. 
The differences between positions of parties and their voters are illustrated in 
Figure 3, which plots the mean position of voters against the mean position of candidates 
for each party on the three dimensions. When the mean positions of candidates and voters 
for a particular party are the same, the party will be placed on the 45 degree reference 
line. For the left/right dimension, the mean positions of candidates and voters are 
relatively close together, with most parties placed on or close to the reference line. The 
differences that exist follow a pattern, in that parties on the right (i.e. where the mean 
candidate has a high score on this dimension) tend to be slightly to the right of their 
average voter, while parties on the left tend to be slightly to the left of their average voter. 
For the culture dimension, the mean position of candidates for most parties is higher than 
the mean position of their voters. Given the way this dimension is orientated, this 
indicates that candidates for most parties are more liberal than their voters on cultural 
issues. 
 
<FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
For the EU dimension, the mean position of candidates is lower than that of voters 
for most parties. This implies that candidates are typically more in favour of EU 
integration than their voters. The three outliers at the top right corner of the graph are 
parties associated with GUE-NGL and EFD, where the mean candidate position is 
strongly anti-EU. The average size of the gap between mean candidate and mean voter 
20 
 
positions is 0.26 on the left/right dimension, 0.52 on the culture dimension and 0.41 on 
the EU dimension.  
 
The compatibility of national parties within political groups 
 
So far, we have established that an important requirement for an effective process of 
political representation is not met. Instead of a single left/right dimension three separate 
policy dimensions can be identified in most EU member states, with different 
relationships between these dimensions for CEE and Western European countries. As 
expected, the congruence between parties and their voters is consistently higher on the 
economic left/right dimension than on the culture and EU dimensions. In this section, we 
investigate whether the process of political representation is still effective when 
transferred to the EU level. As argued above, this will only be the case when an 
additional requirement is met, i.e. when the policy positions of the national parties from 
each political group are compatible. If national parties represent their voters well on the 
left/right dimension and have similar positions on this dimension to the other parties in 
their political group, then we can infer that the groups represent their voters well, albeit 
indirectly. In a similar way, how well voters are represented on the culture and EU 
dimensions depends in part on how well national parties from the same political group in 
the European Parliament match in those terms. 
To estimate policy positions for national parties that are comparable across 
countries, the confirmatory factor analysis model was applied to the candidate data with 
all 27 countries included together. As before, national parties with fewer than five 
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candidates with valid responses to all 11 items are excluded from the analysis. A total of 
61 national parties are included as a result (the breakdown by political group is as 
follows: 15 EPP, 10 S&D, 10 ALDE, 12 Green, 4 ECR, 6 GUE-NGL, and 4 EFD). The 
model has an acceptable fit on most indicators (SRMR=0.06; CFI=0.93; RMSEA=0.09), 
and the three policy dimensions having strong loadings (>.5) on all items. Factor scores 
were produced for each of the three policy dimensions on the basis of this analysis. The 
position of each national party on the three dimensions was calculated as the mean 
position of its candidates. 
Figure 4 shows the position of the national parties from each political group on 
the three policy dimensions. For the left/right dimension, clear differences are apparent 
between groups on the left (GUE-NGL, Green and S&D) and groups on the right (ALDE, 
EPP, ECR, EFD). The national parties for each group are generally clustered closely 
together, although some differences are apparent, particularly in the Green and ALDE 
groups. No significant differences are apparent between Western European countries 
(represented by the white circles) and CEE countries (represented by black circles). 
Overall, political group membership explains 77% of the variation in all national party 
positions on this dimension, and 67% of the variation in the positions of national parties 
associated with the three largest groups (EPP, S&D and ALDE).
6
 Such high figures can 
only be reached if the political groups are to a considerable extent both cohesive and 
distinctive. 
 
<FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
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Turning to the culture dimension, more significant internal divisions are apparent 
in several political groups, and these divisions appear to follow geographic lines. For the 
Greens, S&D and ALDE, parties from CEE countries are noticeably more conservative 
than their Western European counterparts. The internal differences are smallest for the 
relatively extreme GUE-NGL group and for ECR. Political group membership explains 
less variation in party positions on this dimension compared to the left/right dimension: 
the figure for all parties is 69%, and for parties from the three largest groups it is 55%. 
Finally, a noticeably different picture emerges for the EU dimension. The smaller 
fringe parties (GUE-NGL, Greens, ECR and EFD) appear quite divided on this 
dimension, although tending towards the anti-EU end of the spectrum. The larger centre 
parties (EPP, S&D and ALDE) are more cohesive, but there are no significant differences 
between them, as they all take similar pro-EU positions. The percentage of variation in 
party positions explained by group membership is relatively high when all parties are 
analysed (74%), but the figure is just 14% for the three largest parties. This low figure 
results from the lack of distinctiveness of the major parties on the EU dimension. 
The graphs in Figure 4 also reveal something else, namely how positions of the 
political parties on the three dimensions are related (keeping in mind that the positions of 
the groups are not always very clear due to internal differences). Comparing the first and 
second graphs, there is a general tendency for political groups with parties that take leftist 
positions on the left/right dimension to take liberal positions on the cultural dimension. A 
comparison of the first and third graph reveals that at the elite level the left/right and EU 
dimensions are also related, though in a different way. The relationship is not linear but 
follows the familiar pattern: party groups close to the centre of the left/right dimension 
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favour European integration more strongly, whereas party groups further to the left and 
further to the right take a more Eurosceptic position. 
In conclusion, the coherence and compatibility of political groups is highest on 
the left/right dimension, with most of the variation in positions occurring between rather 
than within political groups. The groups are generally more internally fragmented on the 
culture dimension, while for the EU dimension the largest groups are relatively cohesive, 
but not distinctive.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The system of political representation may be viewed as a means to establish the 
democratic ideal of policy congruence between citizens and representatives, and 
ultimately congruence between citizens’ preferences and government policy (Powell 
2000). In this paper we have examined how well the system of democratic representation 
works at the level of the European Union. We have not only analysed policy congruence 
between voters and their representatives in the European Parliament, but also highlighted 
one of the conditions necessary to enable policy congruence between voters and 
representatives: namely, that the attitudes of voters and positions of parties on the key 
issues are constrained by one ideological dimension. The implications of this were 
analysed in the context of the 2009 European Parliament elections on the basis of voter 
and candidate data from the European Election Study. 
Confirmatory factor analysis of voters’ and candidates’ political opinions revealed 
that in fact this crucial condition is not met in the context of elections to the European 
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Parliament. In line with research on previous European Parliament elections (Thomassen 
and Schmitt 1999), it was found that three dimensions were necessary to describe the 
policy attitudes of voters and candidates: an economic left/right dimension, a cultural 
dimension capturing attitudes towards a broad range of social issues, and a dimension 
capturing attitudes towards the EU. The correlations between these dimensions are 
generally modest, particularly when voters alone are considered.  
These findings have two important implications. First, the fact that policy 
preferences are not structured in terms of a single dimension implies that if voters would 
fully base their choice on their policy preferences, this still does not guarantee that parties 
in parliament will reflect the policy preferences of their voters. Second, the fact that the 
dimensions are not highly correlated at the mass level makes it difficult for political 
parties to organise in such a way that citizens will find options that reflect their 
preferences on all three dimensions. 
An analysis of the level of agreement between voters and MEPs on the three 
policy dimensions confirms this. Congruence was found to be higher on the left/right 
dimension than on the culture and EU dimensions for nearly all of the national parties 
analysed. On the culture dimension, most parties were found to have more liberal 
positions than their voters; while on the EU dimension, most parties were found to have 
more pro-EU positions than their voters. 
It has long been noted that a gap exists between political elites and the electorate 
on issues of European integration. The findings here suggest that a substantial gap also 
exists on the cultural dimension. This may explain the success of populist parties across 
Europe in mobilizing voters on issues related to this dimension. The sad news is that with 
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policy preferences that are weakly structured at the level of citizens, adequate 
representation on different types of issues becomes difficult. However, representation can 
work well on particular sets of issues. We found this to be the case on issues related to the 
economic left/right dimension. As long as the majority of the European Parliament’s 
legislative workload relates to economic issues such as the regulation of the single 
market, European elections do fulfil an important function in linking citizens’ and 
representatives’ policy preferences.  
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Notes 
 
1
 While ML assumes the data are continuous, it is generally found to work well on ordinal 
data on at least 5-point scales (Harrington 2008). As a robustness check, an alternative 
Weighted Least Squares estimation was also conducted. There is disagreement in the 
literature as to which approach performs better in presence of ordinal variables (Brown 
2006: 388). However, the results from the two procedures were similar and the ML 
estimates are reported here. 
 
2
 The exact same model was applied to each country, with two minor exceptions. For 
Belgium, it was necessary to allow the ‘response style’ factor to load freely on the 
‘parliament’ item in order to achieve convergence. This might be explained by the fact 
that this question appeared in a different part of the survey from most of the other items. 
For Denmark, it was necessary to allow the covariation in the error terms for the 
‘marriage’ and ‘abortion’ items to reach a good model fit. 
 
3
 The items in the factor analysis are a mix of positively and negatively worded items, but 
a perfectly balanced set was not available. To test if the response style factor does indeed 
measure acquiescence, and not attitudes, we compare it with a balanced set of 18 items 
using 5-point scales in the candidate survey. We follow a procedure suggested by Billiet 
and McClendon (2000: 622-3) and apply it to candidates from the UK (the country with 
the highest number of candidates in the data, at 258). Acquiescence is measured using an 
additive scale that identifies the number of items that respondents agreed with. When this 
27 
 
variable is included as an additional indicator for the response style factor in the 
confirmatory factor analysis, the loading was very high (standardised loading = -.93). 
This supports the conclusion that the response style factor does indeed measure 
acquiescence.  
 
4
 The full model (with three policy factors plus the response style factor) did not achieve 
convergence for these countries. Lack of convergence is a common problem with 
confirmatory factor analysis, particularly with complex models (Brown 2006: 74). A 
simpler model with two policy factors was not an acceptable fit, having several 
insignificant factor loadings.  
 
5
 In a small number of cases, there are two or more parties from the same country 
affiliated with a particular political group in the European Parliament. These parties are 
treated as one single party in the present analysis. 
 
6
 This is based on the R
2
 of an analysis of variance of party positions, with party group 
membership as the independent variable (cf. Schmitt and Thomassen 2009: 37). 
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Figure 1: Path diagram for the structure of policy preferences 
 
 
 
Note: Error paths not included.  
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Figure 2: Differences between voters and parties on three policy dimensions 
 
 
 
 
   
Notes: Entries are the mean absolute difference between the voter positions and the party 
position. Countries are abbreviated as follows. AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The 
Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland: FR: France; DE: Germany; IE: Ireland; 
IT: Italy; LU: Luxembourg; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania SI: 
Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of mean positions of candidates and voters of national parties  
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Figure 4: Positions of national parties on three policy dimensions, organized by political 
group in the European Parliament 
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Table 1: Description of survey items in European Election Study 2009 
Item Description 
Redistribution Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people 
State Public services and industries should be in state ownership 
Enterprise Private enterprise is the best way to solve (country’s) economic problems 
 
Immigration Immigration to (country) should be decreased significantly 
Sentences People who break the law should get much harsher sentences than now 
 
Marriage Same-sex marriage should be prohibited by law 
Abortion Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion 
Trust  You trust the institutions of the European Union 
Parliament The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens 
Referendum EU treaty changes should be decided by referendum 
Democracy How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the EU? (4-point scale) 
 
Note: All items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale with values ranging between 1 
(Strongly agree) and 5 (strongly disagree), except the ‘democracy’ item, which was measured 
using a four-point scale with values ranging between 1 (very satisfied) and 4 (not at all satisfied). 
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Table 2: Results of confirmatory factor analysis of policy preferences: factor loadings by country for Western Europe  
 
   
 Item AT BE CY DK FI FR DE IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK 
L
ef
t/
 
R
ig
h
t 
State .47 .23 .16 .40 .43 .50 .61 .26 .10 .58 .48 .29 .32 .58 .48 
Redistribution .43 .67 .25 .18 .56 .41 .55 .61 .17 .16 .36 .44 .34 .61 .42 
Enterprise -.72 -.29 -.28 -.73 -.21 -.60 -.63 -.22 -.34 -.26 -.35 -.27 -.61 -.61 -.80 
C
u
lt
u
re
 
Immigration .79 .57 .15 .77 .67 .76 .77 .60 .77 .58 .61 .66 .45 .78 .73 
Sentences .62 .41 .19 .67 .57 .57 .54 .41 .48 .53 .53 .36 .44 .54 .64 
Marriage .40 .25 .53 .30 .45 .52 .41 .24 .44 .28 .39 .29 .54 .46 .52 
Abortion -.15 -.11 -.25 -.13 -.12 -.42 -.08 -.06 -.07 -.10 -.24 .04 -.49 -.30 -.22 
E
U
 
Trust .75 .63 .68 .75 .71 .83 .67 .81 .88 .66 .73 .72 .77 .77 .82 
Parliament .75 .62 .49 .58 .59 .70 .68 .62 .56 .64 .66 .66 .62 .64 .73 
Referendum -.54 -.36 -.15 -.36 -.49 -.39 -.39 -.26 -.06 -.39 -.49 -.28 -.20 -.49 -.55 
Democracy .48 .41 .35 .54 .48 .56 .45 .47 .22 .51 .46 .45 .37 .65 .60 
S
ty
le
 
(Mean loading 
across items) 
.21 .28 .37 .10 .21 .20 .22 .20 .23 .22 .18 .24 .22 .13 .20 
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Table 3: Results of confirmatory factor analysis of policy preferences: factor loadings by country for Central and Eastern Europe  
 
  four-factor solution three-factor solution 
 Item CZ EE PL SK SI   BU HU RO 
L
ef
t/
 
R
ig
h
t 
State .46 .51 .47 .70 .29  
L
ef
t/
 R
ig
h
t 
.55 .58 .51 
.34 
-.52 
.27 
.32 
.27 
-.07 
Redistribution .51 .28 .33 .38 .23  .54 .37 
Enterprise -.27 -.33 -.57 -.45 -.30  -.44 
.34 
-.15 
.62 
C
u
lt
u
re
 
Immigration .65 .39 .38 .41 .42 
Sentences .33 .41 .53 .18 .16  -.05 .29 
Marriage .37 .43 .51 .41 .72  .38 .50 
Abortion -.04 -.02 -.28 .02 -.39  -.12 -.15 
E
U
 
Trust .71 .75 .75 .74 .65 
E
U
 
.82 .78 .66 
.64 
-.29 
.36 
Parliament .73 .67 .54 .5 -.26  .67 .62 
Referendum -.31 -.14 -.38 -.17 -.26  -.15 -.38 
Democracy .50 .47 .46 .48 .43  .33 .49 
S
ty
le
 
(Mean loadings 
across items) 
.22 .26 .23 .27 .24  
S
ty
le
 
.26 .31 ..28 
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Table 4: Results of confirmatory factor analysis of policy preferences: model fit and 
inter-factor correlations by country 
 
 Model Fit Inter-Factor Correlations  
 
RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Left/Right
Culture 
Left/Right 
EU 
Culture 
EU N 
Western Europe        
Austria .067 .917 .067 -.42 -.04 -.57 667 
Belgium* .066 .834 .054 -.22 -.14 -.45 674 
Cyprus .042 .900 .042 -.40 -.69 -.05 671 
Denmark* .060 .910 .048 -.63 -.11 -.15 715 
Finland .078 .835 .061 .01 -.48 -.53 600 
France .054 .947 .041 -.70 -.39 -.22 600 
Germany .079 .851 .062 -.17 -.25 -.29 788 
Ireland .050 .900 .043 .27 -.18 -.42 721 
Italy .049 .917 .047 -.64 .07 -.36 657 
Luxembourg .066 .833 .056 -.03 -.20 -.33 721 
Netherlands .099 .745 .072 -.29 -.26 -.46 652 
Portugal .055 .889 .048 .43 -.41 -.57 503 
Spain .057 .891 .046 -.73 -.13 -.10 588 
Sweden .060 .929 .044 -.07 -.57 -.28 782 
UK .077 .914 .052 -.54 .33 -.64 732 
Mean    -.28 -.23 -.36  
Central/Eastern 
Europe (3 factors) 
       
Czech Republic .082 .812 .060 .57 -.34 -.48 411 
Estonia .067 .862 .053 .67 -.53 -.49 419 
Poland .064 .865 .053 .33 -.34 -.58 334 
Slovakia .080 .822 .063 .67 -.33 -.62 350 
Slovenia .065 .835 .062 -.10 -.58 -.12 530 
Mean    .43 -.43 -.46  
Central/Eastern 
Europe (2 factors) 
       
Bulgaria .056 .906 .051 - -.42 - 339 
Hungary .053 .943 .050 - -.85 - 378 
Romania .059 .875 .056 - -.59 - 324 
Mean     -.62   
 
Notes: RMSEA: Root Mean Square Error of Approximation. CFI: Comparative Fit Index. 
SRMR: Standardised Root Mean Square Residual.  
*Minor modifications to the basic model were made for these countries. See footnote 2. 
 
 
